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In this analysis
The United States and European Union are no longer using sanctions on Belarus in quite the same way. Washington has exchanged selective relief for political-prisoner releases and is exploring a large purchase of Belarusian potash. Lithuania argues that repression, support for Russia's war and hybrid pressure on EU borders leave no reason for Europe to soften its position.
The disagreement is not simply about whether sanctions work. It is about the outcome they are meant to produce. Transactional relief seeks discrete, measurable concessions. The EU's framework aims at broader behavioural change: an end to repression, the release of all political prisoners and a genuine national dialogue.
A prisoner release is real, but it is not system change
Belarus released 25 political prisoners in September as the United States eased restrictions on two companies. Those people leaving prison is a tangible humanitarian result. It would be perverse to dismiss it because the bargain was incomplete.
The limitation is scale and reversibility. Hundreds remain imprisoned, while the state can continue detaining opponents. Sanctions relief can therefore purchase individual releases without changing the machinery that creates new prisoners. The negotiating side must decide whether repeated transactions reduce repression or merely turn detainees into replenishable leverage.
Potash changes the strategic signal
A commercial potash deal goes beyond a narrow humanitarian exchange. It would restore revenue to an important Belarusian export industry and make economic engagement part of a wider US strategy that also responds to fertilizer prices and tensions with Canada.
For Lithuania, the issue is inseparable from security. The EU extended its measures until February 2027 and has broadened the regime to cover Belarusian support for Russia and hybrid activity against member states. Lithuania also reported a recent airspace violation from Belarus. In that context, a commodity deal can look like normalization before the underlying conduct has changed.
Sanctions coalitions weaken when members use different scorecards
State & Power's assessment is that both policies reveal a genuine trade-off. A rigid coalition may preserve leverage while leaving prisoners in cells. A transactional policy may free people while gradually eroding the economic pressure intended to change the regime's direction.
The danger is not experimentation itself. It is relief without a common accounting system. Washington and Brussels need to distinguish reversible concessions from permanent ones, prisoner releases from net changes in political detention, and humanitarian gains from revenue that strengthens the state's coercive capacity.
The next test is coordination
Watch whether US deals contain snapback provisions, whether the number of political prisoners falls on a net basis and whether European governments are consulted before relief affects transport routes or sanctions enforcement inside the EU.
If the two sides cannot agree on what counts as progress, Belarus will negotiate against separate Western objectives. That is how a tactical difference becomes a strategic division.