Politics and strategic competition across East, South and Southeast Asia.
US officials increasingly consider a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 unlikely, while the intelligence community says Beijing has no fixed timeline. The distinction between capability and intent is central to credible deterrence.
Washington and Beijing created new channels and limited trade concessions without resolving the disputes that structure their rivalry. Ceremony became a tool for stabilising competition rather than evidence of strategic convergence.
Beijing wants Washington to revisit the logic of the 1982 arms-sales communiqué while the United States treats Taiwan's defence as both a security commitment and negotiating leverage. That makes the island qualitatively different from the summit's trade disputes.
Ottawa is targeting November for separate free-trade agreements with the Philippines and ASEAN as Canada expands economic ties with Southeast Asia.
A 34-country poll records a steep fall in Indian optimism about the next five years, adding another data point to the debate over how households experience headline growth.
Seoul's negotiations with Washington show how trade agreements increasingly blur into strategic bargaining over capital, tariffs and security.
Seoul is weighing how far to support navigation security in a waterway central to its energy imports while managing the political risks of military involvement.
Lee Jae-myung's approval slump illustrates a recurring democratic problem: voters demand cheaper homes while existing owners resist policies that could reduce their wealth.
The Xiangshan Forum gives Beijing a platform to sell cooperation and multipolarity while disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea keep trust in short supply.
Seoul has broadened espionage offences beyond the North Korean threat as semiconductors and industrial know-how become strategic assets.
Economic catastrophe should deter conflict across the Taiwan Strait. History offers little comfort that leaders always choose aggregate prosperity over nationalism and strategic fear.
Housing is turning a technocratic policy problem into a test of whether the government understands the lived economics of younger urban voters.
The island's chip dominance raises the cost of conflict, but economic interdependence is not a substitute for military and political deterrence.
The bloc does not need to become a coherent anti-Western alliance to expand China's influence. It only needs to offer useful alternatives often enough.
Chip policy is no longer about efficiency alone. Governments are paying a premium to decide where strategic capacity physically exists.