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In this analysis
For decades Gulf security planning began with an assumption: whatever the disagreements, the United States remained the external power most capable of protecting the regional order. The Iran war and Houthi pressure have made that assumption less automatic.
Gulf states are responding through overlapping experiments: Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani cooperation, renewed Saudi-UAE contact and a Qatari proposal for a framework that includes Iran. State & Power's October 2026 reader survey points in the same direction at the level of perceived influence: 24% of 2,945 respondents selected Gulf states as the actor that has gained the most practical global influence during 2026, ahead of China at 22% and technology companies at 18%. That ranking is notably stable across the two largest geographic groups: 24% of Israel-based respondents (n=2,474) and 24% of United States-based respondents (n=236) choose Gulf states. On the wider distribution of power, 55% of Israel-based respondents say global power is becoming more dispersed, compared with 51% of the US group. The results describe State & Power's audience, not a representative global electorate.
Diversification is not decoupling
None of the alternatives yet reproduces US intelligence, logistics, air power and command infrastructure. The emerging model is therefore additive. Gulf capitals are trying to create more options so that a refusal in Washington does not become strategic paralysis.
Regional rivals now have incentives to coordinate
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have competing interests, while Qatar has historically pursued a distinct foreign policy. External insecurity can make those differences temporarily less important than the cost of fragmentation.
The test is institutionalisation
A multipolar security order exists only when consultation rules, command relationships, financing and crisis procedures survive beyond individual summits. Until then, the Gulf is searching for an architecture rather than operating one.